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Abstract 
After explaining the reasons why we must urgently reexamine the foundations of the 
market economy, the article goes on to illustrate the main differences between the civil 
market and capitalist market models. It then answers the question of why, in the last quarter 
of a century, the concept of the civil economy has reemerged as a topic of public debate 
and scientific research. In particular, it highlights the reasons why the fourth industrial revo-
lution postulates a civil market if the risks involved with the advancement of transhuman-
ism are to be avoided. The article ends with an invitation to transcend the contradictions of 
the culture of libertarian individualism.
Keywords: fourth industrial revolution, civil market, transhumanism, libertarian individual-
ism, reciprocity.
Resumen
Después de aclarar las razones por las cuales es urgente repensar las bases de la economía 
de mercado, el artículo continúa para ilustrar las principales diferencias entre el modelo 
del mercado civil y el modelo del mercado capitalista. A continuación, se responde a la pre-
gunta de por qué en el último cuarto de siglo la perspectiva del discurso de la economía 
civil está resurgiendo en el debate público, así como en la investigación científica. Se presta 
especial atención a resaltar las razones por las cuales la cuarta revolución industrial debe 
desarrollarse desde un mercado civil si se quieren evitar los riesgos asociados con el avance 
del transhumanismo. El artículo termina con una invitación a superar las aporías de la cul-
tura del individualismo libertario.
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INTRODUCTION
Among the many words in economic –and today, even political– lexicon, 
«market» is undoubtedly the term most frequently used in public discourse 
as well as private conversation. It is perhaps partly for this reason that this 
word is so often misinterpreted and subject to ambiguity, sometimes with 
dangerous consequences. Some examples are in order. There is confusion 
between market as a place where goods and services are exchanged and 
market as a model of social order; between market as an impersonal mecha-
nism for coordinating purchases and sales by a multitude of individuals and 
market as a specific social institution based on a particular cultural matrix; 
between market as a cure and solution to all of society’s ills and market as 
a remote cause of the same ills; and finally, between the market studied by 
the economic sciences and the one addressed by the other branches of 
social science. 
These and other points of confusion would not be so problematic if 
they were purely limited to the realm of contrasting ideas and opinions. 
The trouble arises when the same uncertainty reaches the level of deci-
sion-makers in the political and business spheres. For instance, if a policy-
maker wants to introduce a certain provision based on the belief that the 
market works as described by formal economic theory, without realizing 
the optimal market conditions indicated by the two fundamental theorems 
of welfare economics are idealized and impossible to fulfill, obviously, the 
consequences of that provision could only be negative. Is this not what 
happened with the economic and financial crisis that exploded in 2008? 
The sometimes fierce or exaggerated criticism of the global market or-
der increasingly voiced by the man on the street today, however naively or 
inaccurately, reflects the widespread discomfort with an economic theory 
that channels intellectual energy and huge financial resources into hon-
ing the awareness of an idealized market that will never receive any real 
attention in our modern society. It’s a bit like the discomfort that would 
surround a field of medicine devoted to studying pathologies that would 
never spread in a certain population, rather than working to treat and cure 
the diseases already rampant within that population. 
This essay was written with a twofold intent. On one hand, to help coun-
ter the negative trend described above. At a time when market forces con-
153STEFANO ZAMAGNI  Civil Economy
trol the planet, it is extremely urgent for us to understand the essence and 
nature of the market; when and why the market economy came into exist-
ence; how it has evolved over time; and what challenges the market must 
face and possibly overcome today if it is to remain an instrument of civiliza-
tion and a space for the humanization of economic relations. 
On the other hand, the intent is to dispel the myth that economic knowl-
edge is exclusively relevant to insiders or experts, as though they were 
the only ones capable of mastering and comprehending the mysteries and 
technicalities of the discipline. This is not only factually untrue, but also 
unacceptable to anyone who takes democratic principles to heart, because 
economic issues concern all members of civitas, either as actors or ben-
eficiaries of the actions of others. Democratic citizenship loses its mean-
ing unless all citizens are guaranteed universal access to basic economic 
knowledge. It is unjust to deprive the majority of citizens of an understand-
ing of the economic processes in which they participate and that influence 
their everyday lives. 
Precisely because today, there is no plausible alternative to the mar-
ket economy, it is essential to raise awareness of all the premises of value, 
strengths and weaknesses of this fundamental institution. Otherwise, the 
ability to defend the reasons for freedom would be severely compromised. 
In the following passage from Marcus Tullius Cicero, by replacing the word 
«city» with «market», we would obtain perhaps the most comprehensive 
and relevant definition of what the market really is: 
Cities, too, could not have been built and peopled but for the association 
of men, in consequence of which laws and rules of moral conduct have 
been established, as also an equitable distribution of rights, and a system-
atic training for the work of life. These things have been followed by mild-
ness of disposition and by modesty, and the consequence is that human life 
is better furnished with what it needs, and that by giving, receiving, and 
interchanging commodities and conveniences we may have all our wants 
supplied (Cicero, 1888: 111).
On the pages that follow, I will explain the exact meaning of the key 
words in this passage and propose a solution to the stifling dichotomy that 
sees the domination, on one hand, of neoliberal theory, which claims the 
markets almost always run smoothly and intervention with special regula-
tions is unnecessary, and on the other, of neo-statist theory, which believes 
the markets nearly always fail and the visible hand of the State must inter-
vene. Instead, I will demonstrate that, precisely because the markets often 
do not work well (as everyday reality confirms), intervention is necessary 
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to eliminate the causes of the various failures instead of simply correcting 
their effects, which is the preferred response. As I will explain at the end, 
this is the solution favoured by those who approach the market from the 
viewpoint of the civil economy. Over the course of its rapid evolution, the 
market economy has transformed human relations. The market is not only 
(or rather, not really) an efficient mechanism for regulating trade. It is also 
(and perhaps above all) an ethos, a lifestyle. The market as a model for social 
order arose from fifteenth century civil humanism and developed its own 
humanism. One must understand this in order to realize what is happening 
right before our eyes, and to prepare for the great challenges our societies 
will face due to globalization and the fourth industrial revolution. 
 
1.  FROM THE CIVIL MARKET ECONOMY TO THE CAPITALIST 
MARKET ECONOMY
When can it be said that a society’s economic activity is organized ac-
cording to the market model? In other words, what are the fundamental 
components of the market as a social institution? It is well-known that 
economics are basically the problem of what to produce (what goods and 
services the people who live in a society need or want to be produced); 
how to produce (what technology will be used, and how labor will be or-
ganized to carry out multiple production plans); and for whom to produce 
(which social groups should receive the goods produced, that is, how these 
goods should be distributed among all of the participants). 
Historically, there have been three solutions to the economic problem 
(Zamagni, 2017a, 2016a, 2011a). The oldest is the traditional economy, or 
an economy based on tradition and the community principle. Over time, 
this solution has seen a plurality of variations. One was the sacral hierar-
chy. Starting in the fifteenth century, however, continental Europe began 
to adopt the market solution we are examining in this paper, while the 
October Revolution in Russia (1917) started the spread of the command 
economy based on central planning. In fact, until the fall of the Berlin Wall 
(1989), around 60 % of the world’s population lived in countries that used 
the command economy model, with limited success, to answer the ques-
tions of what, how and for whom to produce. 
So this establishes the first point: the market economy has not existed al-
ways and everywhere, even if it is the only remaining form of economic or-
ganization today the sole exceptions being Cuba and North Korea, as well 
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as the few territories still characterized by the prevalence of traditional 
economic models. This does not mean, however, that there is only one way 
the market economy can be implemented. The latter is merely the genus, 
and many species are possible, each depending on a specific cultural ma-
trix. For instance, there are profound differences between the Anglo-Saxon 
and continental European models of the market economy. The former is 
founded on a clear separation between the economic and social spheres. 
«Business is business», Chester I. Barnard (1938, 1958), the renowned Cali-
fornia business theorist, taught in the 1930s, meaning solidarity and social 
justice are excluded from the market domain. Philanthropic institutions 
are the bridges that link the two spheres. The underlying conceptual frame-
work of the European market economy has been substantially different 
from the outset, in that the company has never been only about business: 
consider the European phenomena of industrial districts, mutual aid com-
panies, cooperatives and public enterprises. But above all, the European 
model is founded on the idea that the market is capable of harboring, along 
with the exchange of equivalents, the principle of reciprocity. 
From the late sixteenth century, the civil market economy –directed to-
wards the common good– began its transformation into the capitalist market 
economy, though the definitive triumph of capitalism as a model for social 
order did not come until the industrial revolution. Capitalism gradually re-
placed the logic of the common good with that of the total good, that is, 
the «profit motive»: productive activity was directed to a single objective, 
the maximization of profits to be distributed among investors in propor-
tion to their share of the capital. With the industrial revolution, the principle 
of fiat productio et pereat homo (production at the expense of man) was 
established, sanctioning the radical separation between suppliers of capital 
and suppliers of labor and definitively abandoning the principle of omnium 
rerum mensura homo (man is the yardstick of everything), which was the 
foundation of the civil market economy at the time of its birth in the fif-
teenth century. The simplest way to understand that the profit motive as 
such was not a constituent element of the market economy is to refer to the 
writings of the civil humanists –such as Leonardo Bruni, Matteo Palmieri, 
Antonino of Florence and Bernardino da Feltre– and the civil economists of 
the eighteenth century –Antonio Genovesi, Giacinto Dragonetti, Pietro Verri 
and Giandomenico Romagnosi. The constant theme in their work is that the 
activities of the market are directed to the common good, from which alone 
they derive their complete justification (Zamagni, 2011). 
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It is worth recalling Saint Bonaventure of Bagnoregio’s early analysis 
of the market’s civil purpose –anticipated in the Summa of his teacher, 
Alexander of Hales– and the principles observed in the sphere of econom-
ic action: the precedence of the community over individual interests; the 
centrality of the basic needs which must be fulfilled before desires; and 
the possibility of deviating from one of the economic prohibitions which 
reached their height in the era: ratio temporis. The Franciscan minister 
general defined the market as an opus civile. Saint Bonaventure’s definition 
of the «good economy» appears in the following precept: «Necessary works 
are always preferable to less useful works, and the better to the good; and 
the excellent to the better, with the exception of useful and urgent works» 
(Saint Bonaventure, 1882-1902: 48). On the other hand, Saint Thomas Aqui-
nas, a pupil of Albertus Magnus, took a far more cautious stance. While rec-
ognizing the merits of the market, the great Dominican wrote that «Thus, in 
such a city, civic life will necessarily be corrupted» (Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
1982: 76-77).
To preempt any misconceptions, note that the two models of the market 
economy (civil and capitalist) are not differentiated by the three mech-
anisms that ensure their functioning –division of labor, growth, freedom 
of enterprise–, which are the same in both cases. What changes are the 
goals of the actors operating in each market, and consequently, the func-
tions the same mechanisms must fulfill. For instance, the division of labor 
is no longer –as in the civil market– a way of ensuring the inclusion of less 
skilled workers in the productive process, but a method of discriminating 
between categories of workers to boost the system’s productivity. Some 
memorable pages were authored by Charles Babbage, the «engineer» of 
the first industrial revolution, who, in contrast to what Adam Smith wrote 
in the An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776), maintained that the great advantage of the division of labor was 
that it allowed masses of illiterate –or semi-literate– yet physically strong 
workers to participate in the productive process without the need for spe-
cific investments in human capital. Thought was only required at the top of 
the corporate structure. The functions assigned to the other two pillars of 
the market were similarly distorted. In particular, the difference lies in the 
understanding of the meaning of work. In the Franciscan school of thought, 
work is grace rather than condemnation or punishment. Saint Benedict 
certainly valued work, but from a penitential perspective. The Franciscans 
replaced the Benedictine ora et labora (pray and work) with «pray by 
working and work by praying». The Testament of Saint Francis reads: «And 
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I worked with my hands, and I still desire to work; and I earnestly desire 
all brothers to give themselves to honest work. Let those who do not know 
how to work learn, not from desire to receive wages, but for example and 
to avoid idleness» (1226 [Acts 20-21]: 125).
In the late eighteenth century, the capitalist concept of the market be-
came dominant until acquiring both cultural and praxic hegemony. The ide-
ology of the civil economy halted with the truly remarkable contribution of 
Genovesi (1765-67), the professor granted the chair of Economics, the first 
of its kind in the world, at the University of Naples in 1753, it was called the 
chair of Civil Economics and his Neopolitan students –Giacinto Dragonetti, 
Ferdinando Galiani, Gaetano Filangieri–, as well as the illuminists of the 
school of Milan –Pietro Verri, Cesare Beccaria, Gian Domenico Romagnosi, 
Carlo Cattaneo, Melchiorre Gioia and others–. The progressive and awe-
inspiring expansion of market relations over the past two centuries ended 
up reinforcing the pessimistic view of human nature already theorized by 
Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville, who argued that only the harsh 
laws of the market could tame the warlike and anarchist impulses of man-
kind (Zamagni, 2011).
How could this have happened? Up until modern times, the Middle Ages 
and Humanism placed virtue ethics at the core of individual and societal 
life, a combination of Aristotelian, Stoic and Christian ethics masterfully 
synthesized by Saint Thomas. The main idea was that despite sin and vice, 
human beings are capable of virtue, that is, performing deeds because they 
are good in themselves. With the Lutheran Reformation, the Augustinian 
doctrine, which had certainly been a foundation of Christian humanism 
until then, but not the only or the main one, spread and became dominant. 
Man is so steeped in egotism that he is actually incapable of virtue, espe-
cially in the political and economic spheres. Hence the Hobbes/Mandev-
ille/Smith/Bentham line of thought. From this perspective, virtue ethics are 
a legacy of medieval Christianitas and therefore something to get rid of. 
The ethics of modern capitalism, focused solely on individual interests and 
the role of the «sad passions» –as Baruch Spinoza identified them (Delauze, 
1980: 25, 1990: 242)– ended up cementing the anthropological impoverish-
ment which can be observed today (Zamagni, 2018; Vera Zamagni, 2011).
The spread of this caricatural view of human nature helped to fuel a 
dual misconception. On one hand, the idea that the sphere of the market 
overlaps with that of egotism, with the space in which everyone pursues, at 
best, their individual interests without a care for anything else. On the oth-
er hand, the idea that the sphere of the State overlaps with that of solidar-
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ity and collective interests. It was on this foundation that the well-known 
dichotomous State-market model was erected, a model which identifies the 
State with the sphere of public interests –as if private individuals were 
incapable of working towards objectives which could be useful to society– 
and the market with the sphere in which only private interests are pursued. 
The most harmful consequence of this model, now and in the past, is that 
the market is only asked to be efficient; that is, to generate as much wealth 
as possible given the existing resources; meanwhile, the State takes respon-
sibility for the redistribution of that wealth post-factum to guarantee so-
cially acceptable levels of equity. The effects of this division of powers are 
well known to all. Market values have tried to encroach on territories not 
their own, in an attempt to marketize spheres occupied by commodities 
which cannot be viewed as merchandise, such as relational goods (Sandel, 
2013). Meanwhile, the State is no longer able, with the classic instruments 
of taxation and direct intervention into the economy, to ensure adequate 
levels of social justice, and above all, to reduce the inequalities which are 
endemically and continuously on the rise in our societies. In fact, interven-
ing post-factum is like transporting water in a bucket full of holes: once it 
reaches its destination, it is almost empty. 
2. THE UPSWING OF INTEREST IN THE CIVIL ECONOMY 
Why, in the past quarter of a century, has the idea of the civil economy 
resurfaced as a topic of public debate more than two centuries after leav-
ing the scene? Why is the transition from national economies to a global 
economy making the civil economy such a compelling topic of study? 
To answer these questions, we should note that since the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the concept of the civil economy has been sidelined 
–as previously mentioned– from scientific research as well as political and 
cultural debate. The reasons for this interruption are multiple and varied. 
I will only mention the two most relevant ones. The first was the wildfire-
like spread, in the highest circles of European culture, of the utilitarian 
philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, whose main work, published in 1789, took 
several decades to become a dominant force in economic discourse. It was 
the influence of utilitarian morality, not Protestant ethics –as some still be-
lieve– that exposed economic theory to the hyper-minimalist anthropology 
of homo oeconomicus, and with it, the doctrine of social atomism. The 
following passage from Bentham is remarkable for its clarity and depth of 
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meaning, «The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual 
persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The 
interest of the community then is, what? –the sum of the interests of the 
several members who compose it» (Bentham, 1823: 4).
The second was the full emergence of the industrial society after the indus-
trial revolution. An industrial society is one which produces goods. Machines 
are ubiquitous, and the rhythm of life is mechanically calibrated. Energy largely 
replaces muscular force, resulting in the huge increases in productivity which 
go along with mass production. Energy and machines transform the nature of 
work, as personal skills are broken down into elementary components. Hence 
the need for coordination and organization. This shaped a world in which men 
are seen as «things» because it is easier to coordinate «things» than men, and 
people are separate from the roles they play. Organizations, starting with com-
panies, deal more with roles than with people. This happened not only within 
the factory, but in society at large. Hence, we understand the deepest meaning 
of Ford-Taylorism as a (successful) attempt to theorize about and implement 
this model of social order. The introduction of the «assembly line» correlated 
with the spread of consumerism; hence the schizophrenia typical of «modern 
times»: on one hand, work increasingly lost its meaning (alienation due to the 
depersonalization of the figure of the worker); and on the other, to counterbal-
ance this, consumption became opulent. Marxist thought and its political ar-
ticulations in the twentieth century worked, with varied and modest success, 
to offer alternatives to this model of society.
Today, the great challenge for both culture and politics is to move beyond 
the traditional model of the capitalist market economy without renouncing 
the advantages this model has contributed thus far. It is not true, as some 
would believe, that if we want to preserve and expand the market-based 
social order, we must necessarily accept (or endure) the market’s traditional 
capitalist format. This is not how it was at the beginning, as mentioned above. 
The belief that the model of financial «turbo-capitalism» no longer works is 
widespread in public opinion today. A golden opportunity to reexamine our 
understanding of the meaning of the market has appeared before us.
3.  THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND CIVILIZATION 
OF THE MARKET
Today, the phenomenon of the fourth industrial revolution is certainly 
the most powerful incentive to reconsider the paradigm of the civil econ-
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omy. It is well-known that the rise of technological convergence –result-
ing from the synergistic combination of nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
information technology and cognitive sciences (acronym nBic)– is radically 
changing not only the production methods, but also and especially the 
social relations and cultural matrix of our society. We do not yet know 
how digital technology and the culture that governs it will change the es-
sence of capitalism in the coming years. However, we do know that a new 
Polanyian-type «great transformation» is having a far-reaching impact on the 
meaning of human work (and on the issue of job destruction), on the rela-
tionship between the market and democracy, and on the ethical dimension 
of human activity (Rocco & Bainbridge, 2002).
Due to the potential of the convergent nBic technologies to empower 
and transform both man and society, technoscience is receiving extraordi-
nary attention in a plurality of areas, including the cultural, scientific, eco-
nomic and political arenas. The objectives are not limited to expanding the 
mind, improving the diagnostic and therapeutic capabilities for a host of 
diseases, or even developing ways to control and manipulate information. 
The artificialization of man and, at the same time, the anthropomorphiza-
tion of the machine are on the horizon. The veil of silence should be lifted 
on this subject to open a high-profile debate. The question, in fact, reaches 
the level of anthropological discourse. Two different ideas of man stand in 
contrast: the man-person and the man-machine. The latter is gaining ground 
on the former. This explains, among other things, why the man-machine ide-
al is creating a real educational emergency today: training/instruction have 
taken the place of education. The man-machine «asks» for instruction; he 
does not need education. We must reference equilibration theory, in which 
the driver of mental development in children and young adults is a process 
of cognitive adaptation to information received from the outside world. 
Nothing could be more mechanistic; it’s a concept inspired by the prin-
ciple of homeostasis, the same one underlying cybernetic theory. A disturb-
ing sign of this reductionism is the progressive disappearance of the figure 
of the educator. The teacher-instructor is reduced to a facilitator or media-
tor who, rather than educate, must support the process of self-study or self-
training, because only what one does by oneself has value. This is one of 
the most devastating consequences of libertarian individualism, on which 
I will comment in the last paragraph This brings to mind the philosophy of 
Hannah Arendt, who argued in «The crisis in Education» (1954) that teach-
ers assume responsibility for the world the students are to enter. Moreover, 
this declaration of anti-authoritarianism (it is not necessary to condition or 
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guide the subject’s free-will choices) actually contains a hidden authoritar-
ian concept: only the expert in self-directed learning is qualified to speak 
about school. However, teaching methods do not give one knowledge, nor 
do they allow it to be measured objectively, as people tend to believe. One 
potentially interesting fact is that there is already evidence of iPhone de-
pendence in a growing number of young people, and symptoms such as de-
pression and reduced reasoning skills have been detected in young smart-
phone «addicts». In fact, two of the largest U.S. investment funds (CalSTRS, 
the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, and the hedge fund Jana 
Partners) have formally invited Apple to take steps to address the intensity 
and usage of its new phones and prepare specific measures for teachers 
(the thinly-veiled threat was that they would dump their two billion in 
shares in Apple, an example of «voting with one’s wallet»1).
On a related note, I would like to highlight one of the results, perhaps 
unwanted and fraught with negative consequences, of the digital revolu-
tion. It concerns the impact of computers and information technology on 
the way in which researchers approach the scientific truth. In fact, we are 
witnessing the emergence of an analogical reasoning model based on veri-
similitude rather than truth: reality is analyzed by mathematical models of 
approximation entrusted to software that can rely on increasingly power-
ful computers. As Paolo Benanti (2017) points out, the epistemological per-
spective has shifted so dramatically that the priority of research is no longer 
to know reality, but to acquire the ever-expanding capacity to modify –and 
manipulate– it. In other words, the triumph of technology means a crisis 
for scientific knowledge, a conclusion which has been drawn since the 
scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. With the new approach, 
algorithms are the essence of the reality being studied, so the advancement 
of knowledge depends on the availability of data. With remarkable perspi-
cacity Chris Anderson –editor of Wired– in an article with a revealing title 
–«End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete» 
(23 of juny, 2018)– wrote:
The scientific method is built around testable hypotheses [...] But faced with massive data, 
this approach to science –hypothesize, model, test– is becoming obsolete [...] There is 
now a better way. Petabytes allow us to say: ‘Correlation is enough.’ We can stop looking 
for models. We can analyze the data without hypotheses about what it might show [...] The 
new availability of huge amounts of data, along with the statistical tools to crunch these 
numbers, offers a whole new way of understanding the world. Correlation supersedes 
1  For a stimulating critical dissertation, refer to Palazzani (2015).
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causation, and science can advance even without coherent models, unified theories, or 
really any mechanistic explanation at all.
This is not the place to discuss the truly disruptive consequences of the 
new gnoseological paradigms that are gaining ever-increasing support to-
day. But the moment we believe the causal links between phenomena can 
be safely replaced by avalanches of correlations, we deny the very founda-
tion of the scientific method, the method which gave birth to the first three 
industrial revolutions. The point being that if one abandons the category of 
causality, one neglects to explain what is and what occurs; one declines to 
separate the description of the results from their interpretation. And with-
out explanation and interpretation, there can be no scientific progress. 
When we face problems such as those just mentioned, we come to un-
derstand the serious limitations of libertarian individualism as the anthro-
pological foundation of the paradigm of homo oeconomicus, as opposed 
to that of homo reciprocans in the civil economy. It is well-known that the 
philosophy of individualism stresses that only individuals can assign value 
to things and interpersonal relationships. And it is the individual alone who 
decides what is good and what is bad; what is lawful and what is illicit. 
In other words, everything to which the individual assigns value is good. 
There are no objective values  for axiological individualism, there are only 
subjective values  or legitimate preferences. In the essay Individually, To-
gether (2008), Zygmunt Bauman explains that «casting members as indi-
viduals [and not as persons] is the trademark of modern society» (2008: 
29). Individualization, continues Bauman, «consists in transforming human 
‘identity’ from a «given» into a «task» – and charging the actors with the 
responsibility for performing that task and for the consequences of their 
performance» (2008: 31). Bauman’s thesis, therefore, is that «individualiza-
tion brings to the ever growing number of men and women an unprec-
edented freedom of experimenting, but it also brings an unprecedented 
task of coping with the consequences» (2008: 39). Therefore, the yawning 
gap between the «right of self-assertion» and the «capacity to control the 
social settings» which make such self-realization feasible, «seems to be the 
main contradiction of the second modernity» (2008: 39).
On the other hand, libertarianism, a thesis espoused by many philoso-
phers, states that freedom and individual responsibility must be founded on 
the idea of  autocausation. For example, among many others, Galen Straw-
son, in the essay Free Agents (2012), argues that a fully free agent can only 
be self-caused and self-created, or in his words, causa sui and almost god-
like. One can now understand why the union between individualism and 
163STEFANO ZAMAGNI  Civil Economy
libertarianism, that is, libertarian individualism, could have originated volo 
ergo sum, that is, «I desire therefore I am», as the catchphrase for this era. 
The radicalization of individualism in libertarian and therefore antisocial 
terms leads to the conclusion that everyone has the «right» to expand as 
far as his power allows. Freedom as the dissolution from bonds is the domi-
nant idea in cultural circles today. Bonds would have to be cut inasmuch as 
they would limit freedom. By mistakenly matching the concept of «bond» 
to that of «constraint», one ends up confusing what may condition freedom 
– the constraints – with the essence of freedom, that is, bonds. 
This aspect was grasped by Michel Foucault with rare perspicacity when 
discussing the problem of access to the truth. He wondered if we live at a 
time when the market has become a «place of truth», in which the subjects’ 
entire lives have been subsumed into economic efficiency, and the market 
even determines that «to be a good government», the government should 
function based on this site of veridiction: «The market must tell the truth; 
it must tell the truth in relation to governmental practice. Henceforth, and 
merely secondarily, it is its role of veridiction that will command, dictate 
and prescribe the jurisdictional mechanisms, or absence of such mecha-
nisms, on which [the market] must be articulated» (Foucault, 2008: 32).
The uncritical acceptance of possessive individualism impacted eco-
nomics in a way which was perhaps unexpected: the triumph of a market 
theory antithetical to the traditional notion of the civil economy. A view-
point of the market as an institution founded on two standards: the imper-
sonality of relationships of exchange (the less I know my counterpart, the 
greater my advantage, because business is better with the strangers!); and 
the exclusively self-interested motives of the participants, so moral senti-
ments such as sympathy, reciprocity, fraternity, etc. are left outside of the 
market arena. The progressive and majestic expansion of market relations 
over the last century and a half ended up reinforcing the pessimistic inter-
pretation of human nature previously theorized by Hobbes and Mandeville, 
who claimed only the harsh laws of the market could tame man’s perverse 
impulses and anarchist drives. The acceptance of this caricatural view of 
human nature helped foster a dual misconception: that the sphere of the 
market coincides with that of selfishness, with a space where everyone pur-
sues, at best, their individual interests and, symmetrically, that the sphere 
of the State coincides with that of solidarity, of the pursuit of collective 
interests. It is on this foundation that the well-known dichotomous state-
market model was erected: a model by which the State is identified with 
the sphere of the public and the market with the sphere of the private.
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What component of our conceptual infrastructure must change in order 
to transcend the individualistic-libertarian understanding that is widespread 
today? Firstly, we must abandon the anthropological pessimism that began 
with Francesco Guicciardini and Ciccolò Machiavelli, continued with Hob-
bes and Mandeville and reached the modern economic mainstream. This is 
the assumption that human beings are too opportunistic and self-interested 
to show consideration, in their actions, for concepts such as moral senti-
ments, reciprocity, the common good and more. In his famous book The Fa-
ble of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits (1714), Mandeville wrote: 
I flatter myself to have demonstrated that neither the friendly qualities and kind affections 
that are natural to man, nor the real virtues he is capable of acquiring… are the foundation 
of society. But that what we call evil in this world, moral as well as natural, is the grand 
principle that makes us sociable creatures, the solid basis, the life and support of all trades 
and employments without exception (1724: 427-428)
Such anthropological cynicism – based, mind you, on assumptions in-
stead of findings from the real world – was one of the building blocks of the 
imposing edifice of self-interest which remains the dominant paradigm in 
economics today. It is clear, or should result so after careful reflection, that 
on the horizon of homo oeconomicus, there will be no room to resolve the 
ethical dilemmas arising from technological convergence. In fact, from the 
perspective of this discourse, man is a one-dimensional being capable of 
acting to achieve a single purpose. The other dimensions –political, social, 
emotional and religious– must remain strictly separate, and at worst, they 
can help to compose the system of constraints under which the objective 
function of the agents is optimized. The category of the «common» has two 
dimensions: the being-in-common and what one has in common. Well, it is 
clear that to solve the dilemma of what one has in common, the subjects 
involved must recognize their being-in-common.
Evidently, such a concept would make sense if all or most individuals 
were self-interested and asocial subjects. But the factual evidence, which is 
now very abundant and derived from both laboratory experiments and em-
pirical investigations, tells us this is not the case, because in fact, the major-
ity exhibit prosocial behaviors (for example, sacrificing oneself to achieve 
collective goals) and not self-interested ones (for example, habitually giving 
freely). That is why Lynn Stout (2011) makes the compelling case that the 
conscience, that inner strength which inspires pro-social and non-egoistic 
behavior, should be taken seriously in legal theory. Conceptualizing the 
law as a sort of price system which charges damages for various forms 
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of negligence and non-compliance with contractual terms has the clearly 
negative effect of raising the cost of the conscience. Teaching selfishness is 
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
We know the behavioral traits observed in the real world –prosocial, 
asocial, antisocial– are ubiquitous in society. What changes from one soci-
ety to another is their combination: in some periods of history, anti-social 
and/or asocial behaviors prevailed, while others were defined by proso-
cial behaviours, and it is easy to imagine the economic and civil progress 
that ensued. A question arises: in a given society, during a given historical 
period, what determines whether one type of behavioral trait or another 
prevails? Well, the decisive factor, though not the only one, is the way the 
legislative system is articulated. Imagine a lawmaker who embraces a Hob-
besian-type anthropology, drafting regulations that impose harsh penalties 
and punishments on all citizens to ensure the prevention of illegal activity 
by antisocial individuals. Clearly the prosocial –and asocial– citizens, who 
would have no need for those deterrents, would be unable to bear the cost. 
Therefore, albeit reluctantly, they would tend to endogenously modify their 
motivation system. As Stout (2011) writes, if you want there to be more 
good people, you should not tempt them to be bad.
This is the mechanism of crowding out: Hobbesian-style laws tend to 
increase the percentage of extrinsic motivation in the population, encour-
aging the spread of antisocial behavior. This is precisely because antisocial 
types are not as bothered by the costs of law enforcement, since they will 
always try to avoid them (consider tax evasion and avoidance). In light of 
the above, we can now understand how and where to intervene in order to 
rapidly promote practices that counter the spread of individualistic behav-
iors. As long as we think of economics as a type of activity which can only 
be ruled by the logic of homo oeconomicus, we will never acknowledge 
there can be a civilized way of managing the economy. But this depends 
on the theory, that is, the lens through which one examines reality and not 
reality itself.
IN CONCLUSION
A winning strategy to keep individualism within acceptable limits is to 
recenter public discourse on the principle of fraternity. One of the great 
merits of European culture is how it managed to incorporate the principle 
of fraternity in institutional and economic terms, making it a fundamental 
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axis of social order. It was Franciscan thought that gave this term the mean-
ing it has conserved over time. Certain pages of the Rule of Saint Francis 
can help us to understand the proper meaning of the principle of fraternity. 
That is, to simultaneously complement and transcend the principle of soli-
darity. For while solidarity is the principle of social organization that allows 
unequals to become equals, fraternity is the principle of social organization 
that allows equals to be diverse. Fraternity allows people who are equal in 
dignity and in fundamental rights to have different life plans and express 
their charisma uniquely. Other eras, the nineteenth century and especially 
the twentieth century, were characterized by great cultural and political 
battles in the name of solidarity, and this was a good thing; consider the 
history of the labor movement and the civil rights struggle. The point is 
that a good society cannot limit itself to solidarity, because if a society were 
only solidary and not fraternal, it would be a society from which everyone 
would try to escape. The fact is that while a fraternal society is also a soli-
dary society, the opposite is not true (Zamagni, 2018).
Furthermore, without gratuitousness, there can be no hope. Gratuitous-
ness, in fact, is not an ethical virtue like justice. It concerns the sovereign 
dimension of human action; its logic is that of overabundance. The logic 
of justice, on the other hand, is that of equivalence, as Aristotle taught. We 
understand then why hope cannot anchor itself to justice. Hypothetically, 
in a perfectly just society, there would be no room for hope. What could 
its citizens ever hope for? That would not be the case in a society rooted 
in the principle of fraternity, precisely because hope is nourished by over-
abundance.
The failure to produce a credible solution to that trade-off, despite the 
quality of the intellectual forces deployed, is due to the failure to remember 
that a human society in which the sense of fraternity is extinguished – in 
which everything is reduced to improving transactions based on equiva-
lent exchange and increasing public welfare transfers – is an unsustainable 
society. A society which lacks the principle of fraternity has no future; that 
is, a society in which there is only «give in order to receive» or «give out of 
duty» is incapable of progress. This is why neither the liberal-individualist 
worldview, in which everything (or almost) is exchange, nor the State-cen-
tric view of society, in which everything (or almost) is duty, is a safe guide 
to lead us out of the quagmire in which the fourth industrial revolution is 
testing the endurance of our model of civilization.
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